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THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION'S
30-DAY INQUIRY UNDER THE ANTIDUMPING ACT:
SECTION 201(c)(2)*
By

JOHN

and F.

F.

MCDERMID**

DAVID FOSTER***

In 1921, a new antidumping act was enacted into domestic law., The
Antidumping Act of 1921 was part of a coordinated effort by the U.S.
government to protect infant U.S. industries, particularly the petrochemical industry which burgeoned during World War I, from the increasing
competition of European industries seeking markets to utilize capacity
which had been devoted to war efforts.' The Act was directed against
international price discrimination, and the substance of its principal operative provision remained unchanged through a series of amendments.' Basically, the Antidumping Act provides that articles imported into the
United States will be subject to a special duty when such articles are being,
* The opinions and observations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent those of the U.S. International Trade Commission, of individual
Commissioners, or of the Department of the Treasury.
** Attorney-Adviser, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. American
University (J.D., 1972); University of Brussels, Belgium (LL.M., 1973). Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
*** Assistant to the Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.
Arizona State University (B.A., 1969; J.D., 1972); Columbia University (LL.M., 1973). Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. The new act was known as the Antidumping Act of 1921 [hereinafter the Antidumping
ActI, 19 U.S.C.A. §160 et seq. (Supp. 1976). The first antidumping act was enacted in 1916
as §§ 800-01 of the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 798.
2. The 1916 antidumping act, which is a criminal statute requiring proof of specific intent
to engage in dumping, was the first attempt by Congress in this century to cope with the
threat of cartel dumping-particularly predatory dumping as exercised by German exporters.
Congressman Denison's remarks were not unlike many of those made on the House and
Senate floors:
There was a universal demand for the enactment of such protective legislation
[antidumping and tariff] as would encourage American capital to . . . establish
the industry on a firm footing in this country, so that. . . we would be independent
of the German [dyestuffsj monopoly. 53 CONG. REC. 1473 (1916).
The Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, of which the Antidumping Act of 1921 was Title II, was
passed for many of the same reasons as the comparable provision in the 1916 Revenue Act.
3. The Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §160 et seq. (Supp. 1976), has been amended three
times since its passage in 1921. The Customs Simplification Act, 68 Stat. 1138 (1954), transferred the injury determination from the Department of the Treasury to the U.S. International Trade Commission and provided that such Commission determination had to be made
within three months. The second amendment, 72 Stat. 583 (1958), provided that an evenly
divided Commission vote should be deemed an affirmative determination. The third amendment occurred in 1974 with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978, as described
herein.
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or are likely to be, sold at less than fair value' and an industry in the
United States is being, or is likely to be, injured or is prevented from being
established by reason of the importation into the United States of the
articles.
Although the substance of the principal operative provision of the Antidumping Act has been constant, there have been several significant
amendments with respect to its administration. One such amendment occurred in 1954; it transferred from the Secretary of the Treasury to the
U.S. International Trade Commission (at that time the U.S. Tariff Commission)-' the basic statutory determination of whether an industry in the
United States is suffering the requisite injury set forth in the statute: that
it is being, or is likely to be, injured or is prevented from being established.
The Secretary of the Treasury retained the authority to determine whether
less-than-fair-value (LTFV) sales are being, or are likely to be made. The
primary reason for the amendment to have the Commission determine the
question of injury was the Commission's generally recognized expertise in
dealing with the complexities of reaching such a determination.' This
amendment established the Commission's function in the administration
of the Antidumping Act, and that function remained unchanged until the
enactment of the Trade Act of 1974.1
The Commission's function under the Antidumping Act was supplemented by the addition of section 201(c)(2) to that Act.' The provisions of
the Antidumping Act, almost without exception, are activated by the filing
of a petition with the Department of the Treasury on behalf of a domestic industry. Upon the filing of a petition, the proper authorities in the
Treasury Department must determine whether to institute a formal investigation based upon such petition. Section 201(c)(2) is applicable at this
point, and provides:
If, in the course of making a determination under paragraph (1) [a
determination of whether to institute an antidumping investigation], the
Secretary concludes, from the information available to him, that there is
substantial doubt whether an industry in the United States is being or is
likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of
the importation of such merchandise into the United States, he shall
4. Sold at less than fair value generally means sold for less in the United States than in
the home market of the exporter.
5. The U.S. Tariff Commission was renamed the U.S. International Trade Commission
by §171 of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2009.
6. See, e.g., the testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Chapman Rose at the
hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives on
the Customs Simplification Act of 1954. H.R. REP. No. 2453, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1954).
7. 88 Stat. 1978 (1974).
8. Section 201(c)(2) was added by §321(a) of the Trade Act, 88 Stat. 2044, codified at 19
U.S.C.A. §160(c)(2) (Supp. 1976).
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forward to the Commission the reasons for such substantial doubt and a
preliminary indication, based upon whatever price information is available, concerning possible sales at less than fair value, including possible
margins of dumping and the volume of trade. If within thirty days after
receipt of such information from the Secretary, the Commission, after
conducting such inquiry as it deems appropriate, determines there is no
reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is being or is
likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of
the importation of such merchandise into the United States, it shall advise the Secretary of its determination and any investigation under
subsection (b) then in progress shall be terminated.'
The possibility of terminating at an early stage formal proceedings under
the Antidumping Act makes section 201(c)(2) a potentially significant
addition to the Act. This article will explore the activity under section
201(c)(2) since its enactment more than a year ago, including the procedures being followed in the administration of that section by the Treasury
and the Commission and the interpretation being given to the language of
that section.
I.

BACKGROUND OF SECTION

201(c)(2)

The 1974 Trade Act, which, as indicated, added section 201(c)(2) to the
Antidumping Act, is the result of a series of legislative proposals that
began with the introduction of an administration bill (H.R. 6767) into the
House of Representatives during the first session of the 93d Congress on
April 10, 1973. This bill was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House. After consideration of H.R. 6767, the Committee introduced
its own bill (H.R. 10710) on October 3, 1973, and that bill was reported
out of the Committee without amendment on October 10, 1973. As reported out and as finally passed by the full House of Representatives on
December 11, 1973, H.R. 10710, like H.R. 6767, did not contain a provision
comparable to section 201(c)(2). H.R. 10710 was sent to the Senate, where
it was referred to the Committee on Finance. Late in the consideration of
the bill by the Finance Committee, during the "mark-up" of the bill in
executive session of the Committee, the Treasury Department suggested
the amendment which ultimately became section 201(c)(2). H.R. 10710,
with the new amendment, was reported out of the Finance Committee on
November 26, 1974, and passed the full Senate on December 13. The
Conference Committee, convened to reconcile the different versions of the
bill passed by the House and Senate, accepted the addition of section
201(c)(2) as proposed by the Senate, and the conference report was accepted by both houses, which passed H.R. 10710 on December 20. The
9.

19 U.S.C.A. §160(c)(2) (Supp. 1976).
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President signed it on January 3, 1975, making it the Trade Act of 1974.
Section 201(c)(2) became effective immediately. 0
The legislative history pertaining to section 201(c)(2) contains very little
guidance regarding its specific purpose. The report of the Finance Committee on the bill which became the Trade Act of 1974 indicates that:
Under the present Act, the Secretary of the Treasury must complete his
entire investigation as to sales at less than fair value before the matter can
be referred to the International Trade Commission for its injury determination. The Committee felt that there ought to be a procedure for terminating investigations at an earlier stage where there was no reasonable
indication that injury or the likelihood of injury could be found. Therefore,
the Committee adopted a new provision, section 201(c)(2), which provides
for the elimination, at an early stage of the antidumping proceedings, of
those cases in which there is no reasonable indication that an industry in
the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from
being established, by reason of the importation of the merchandise concerned into the United States. The amendment is designed to eliminate
unnecessary and costly investigations which are an administrative burden
and an impediment to trade."
There are no additional legislative materials which provide insight into the
purpose of section 201(c)(2).
One can speculate that another purpose in the enactment of this section
was to remove all questions respecting injury, including preliminary ones,
from the Treasury and place them with the Commission where the basic
ultimate determination under section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act regarding the requisite injury to a domestic industry has been lodged and
where, presumably, the expertise to make such determination is found.
Treasury's rules of procedure since July 1, 1968, but before enactment of
section 201(c)(2), required a petitioner to furnish "information indicating
that an industry in the United States" was suffering the requisite injury"
and provided that petitions which did not conform to this requirement
could be rejected. 3 The Treasury rules also provided for a summary investigation of the information presented; if it was determined as a result that
further investigation was not warranted because "the information is patently in error, or that merchandise of the class or kind is not being and is
not likely to be imported in more than insignificant quantities, or for other
reasons," Treasury's investigation would be terminated. 4 It has been
argued that Treasury lacked the authority to terminate its proceedings
10.

Trade Act §321(g)(1), 19 U.S.C.A. §160 at note (Supp. 1976).

11.

SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. REP.
FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].

Cong., 2d Sess. 170-71 (1974) [hereinafter
12.
13.
14.

19 C.F.R. §153.27 (1975).

Id. at §153.28.
Id. at §153.29.

No. 93-1298, 93d
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after the summary investigation, provided for in the rules, with respect to
the question of requisite injury under the Antidumping Act.' 5 In fact,
Treasury has never so terminated its proceedings.
Thus, the contention may be made that section 201(c)(2) was enacted
to permit Treasury to refer preliminary questions of injury to the Commission so that the Commission could determine whether the information
available with respect to injury was sufficient to continue Treasury's proceeding, removing all question of ultra vires activities on the part of Treasury and bringing to bear on injury questions the Commission's experience
in the area. There is no support in the legislative history for this reasoning,
but it is certainly possible that such could have been a purpose of the
section. Whether it was a purpose or not, it is, in fact, the result of the
addition of section 201(c)(2) to the Antidumping Act. In view of the specific statutory provision providing for the manner in which preliminary
questions of injury are to be dealt with, whatever authority Treasury may
have had with respect to such matters is no longer available."'
One could speculate further that yet another purpose of section 201(c)(2)
was to conform the administration of the Antidumping Act to the requirements of the International Antidumping Code." The Code requires, in
effect, a concurrent examination of the issues of LTFV sales and injury."
As indicated in the Finance Committee Report, the procedure followed
under the U.S. Antidumping Act prior to the addition of section 201(c)(2)
was for Treasury to make its determination with respect to LTFV sales,
followed by the Commission determination with respect to injury. Perhaps
section 201(c)(2) could result in a concurrent consideration of the question
of LTFV sales and injury, since Treasury under the section could refer
preliminary questions of injury to the Commission.
However, it is extremely doubtful that conformity with the Antidumping
Code was a purpose in the enactment of section 201(c)(2). First, the legislative committee which proposed the amendment, the Senate Finance Committee, historically has been opposed to reading the provisions of the Antidumping Act to conform to the requirements of the Antidumping Code
and surely would not amend the Antidumping Act to conform to it." Fur15. The basic argument that such a termination was an ultra vires act was premised upon
the 1954 amendment to the Antidumping Act, 68 Stat. 1138, which bifurcated the proceedings, providing for a determination by Treasury of LTFV sales only and giving to the Commission the authority to determine questions of injury.
16. Section 201(c)(2) provides for the Commission to find no reasonable indication and
report this to the Secretary of the Treasury within 30 days in order for any Treasury investigation being conducted to be terminated. In view of this, it is probable that if the Commission
were not to meet the 30-day time limit, the Treasury investigation does not terminate as a
matter of law.
17. 4 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (1968).
18. Id. at art. 5(c).
19. See Hearings on the InternationalAntidumping Code Before the Senate Committee
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thermore, since the addition of section 201(c)(2), Treasury, which refers
proceedings under that section to the Commission, has not referred all
proceedings filed under the Antidumping Act since the section requires
Treasury first to determine that there is a "substantial doubt" of finding
the requisite injury. Complete referral would appear to be necessary if the
purpose of the section were to conform to the requirements of the International Antidumping Code, since less than that would result in only a cursory concurrent examination by Treasury, not likely to satisfy the requirements of the Code. Indeed, even referral in every case may not satisfy the
Code since the Commission's activities under section 201(c)(2) last no
more than 30 days, while Treasury's investigation of the question of LTFV
sales lasts many months.
II.

ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION

201(c)(2)

The impact of section 201(c)(2) on the course of proceedings under the
Antidumping Act is dependent to a significant degree upon how the Treasury and the Commission administer the section. As will be seen, both
agencies have wide discretion in such administration. Inasmuch as proceedings under section 201(c)(2) are begun at Treasury, the following
will examine Treasury's proceedings, and then turn to a consideration of
the Commission's proceedings.
A.

Administration By The Department Of The Treasury

The basic requirements and procedures for filing for relief from dumping
did not change with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974. The Treasury's
administration of antidumping investigations continues to be split between the Customs Service and the Office of Tariff Affairs at Treasury.
The Customs Service does the statistical gathering-the leg work-and the
Office of Tariff Affairs monitors this work for both statistical and legal
accuracy and makes all determinations called for by the Antidumping Act.
For convenience, the general term "Treasury" will be used hereafter to
refer to the Customs Service, the Office of Tariff Affairs, and the Secretary
of the Treasury with respect to their activities under the Antidumping Act
20
since several subdelegations of authority have occurred.
Before enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the initiation of an antion Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
20. It would be a rare occasion for the Secretary of the Treasury to make a determination
under the Antidumping Act or sign such determination. This authority has been delegated
within the Treasury to David R. Macdonald, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs. Continuing down the hierarchy, one finds James Clawson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs, and Peter 0. Suchman,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tariff Affairs. Mr. Suchman is the individual primarily involved in the decision-making process under the Antidumping Act.
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dumping investigation began with the filing of information on price discrimination and injury with the Commissioner of Customs. Although this
information could have been submitted by any district director of Customs,2 ' this rarely was done. Generally, information was received in writing
with the Commissioner of Customs, pursuant to a regulation which provided that any person who suspected dumping was occurring could file
information to begin an investigation." So as to conform to U.S. international obligations, whoever filed before Customs had to do so "on behalf
of an industry" in the United States. 3 The vast majority of submissions
were filed by domestic producers. Prior to the passage of the Trade Act,
the information required of the petitioning person included detailed price
data which indicated less-than-fair-value sales and "information indicating" that an industry in the United States is being, or is likely to be,
injured or is prevented from being established because of the allegedly
unfairly priced imports. 4 If the information on either pricing or injury was
not adequate, the Commissioner returned the communication to the filing
party with reasons why it did not conform to the regulations.2
As indicated above, it was an administrative requirement that injury
information be received by the Customs Service. As a matter of practice,
however, it was an exception for Customs to return a communication on
the basis of inadequate injury information. This pro forma treatment given
to injury information perhaps was based upon a belief held by the Customs
Service that the question of injury to an industry was best evaluated at a
latter stage by the Commission. Nonetheless, if an Antidumping Proceeding Notice2 1 was published, it was necessary that a stipulation be included
that some evidence was on record indicating injury."
21. 19 C.F.R. §153.25 (1975).
22. Id. at §153.26 (1975).
23. On June 30, 1967, the United States signed an "Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the GATT," the most important provisions of which are referred to as the
International Antidumping Code, 4 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (1968). Article 4 of the
code states that the phrase "domestic industry" generally refers "to the domestic producers
as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production.
As for the initiation
of an antidumping investigation, article 5 provides, in part:
(a) Investigations shall normally be initiated upon a request on behalf of the
industry affected, supported by evidence both of dumping and of injury resulting
therefrom for this industry. If in special circumstances the authorities concerned
decide to initiate an investigation without having received such request, they shall
proceed only if they have evidence both on dumping and on injury resulting therefrom.
24. 19 C.F.R. §153.27 (1975).
25. 19 C.F.R. §153.28 (1975).
26. This notice is provided for in 19 C.F.R. §153.30(b) (1975) and informs the public that
the Treasury has begun a formal investigation with respect to determining whether dumping
is in fact occurring.
27. 19 C.F.R. §153.30(3)(4) (1975).

-664
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After the receipt by the Commissioner of Customs of information in
conformity with the regulations, a "summary investigation" was initiated.
This proceeding was terminated if the information received was "patently
in error" or if for other reasons "further investigation was not warranted." 2
Generally, within 30 days after receiving information in conformity with
the regulations, the Commissioner of Customs published an Antidumping
Proceeding Notice in the Federal Register.9 At this point, a full scale
investigation was begun by the Customs Service.
On January 3, 1975, when the Trade Act became law, the antidumping
amendments became effective."' The immediate implementation of new
section 201(c) of the Antidumping Act necessarily required the Treasury
to conform its regulations governing antidumping procedures with the provisions of the Trade Act. For interested persons filing on behalf of an
industry allegedly injured from international price discrimination, the new
statutory provisions and proposed regulations implementing the new provision3 1' meant considerably more detailed information would be necessary
before the Treasury would accept the petition.
The proposed regulations do not change the standards for those who
have standing to petition, and there are no significant changes regarding
the pricing information required. Reflecting the new statutory language,
the primary thrust of the regulations is directed to the receipt by Customs
of substantial information pertaining to injury or likelihood of injury or the
prevention of establishment of an industry in the United States. The new
requirements, as reflected in the proposed regulations are in sharp contrast
to the old requirements, since the old requirements simply called for general information indicating injury to an industry. The proposed rules require a petitioner to furnish the Customs Service substantial facts relating
to injury, including, for example, information on domestic production,
sales, and prices on profitability and unemployment in the industry, and
32
on the volume of imports and market share of the imported merchandise.
As of this writing, information available to us indicates that every petition
filed with the Customs Service since the effective date of section
28. 19 C.F.R. §153.29 (1975).
29. 19 C.F.R. §153.30(b) (1975), supra note 26.
30. See text supra at note 10.
31. The proposed new regulations were published in 40 Fed. Reg. 30825 (July 23, 1975).
As of this writing, the proposed regulations have not become effective. Shortly after passage
of the Trade Act, the Customs Service sent petitioners an "Antidumping Questionnaire,"
which furnished interested petitioners with the new requirements for a proper petition. Experience gained from the practice of sending the questionnaire led to the proposed regulations,
which were drafted in mid-June. This "Antidumping Questionnaire" was only a temporary
measure pending the promulgation of new rules and should not be confused with the questionnaire distributed by Customs following the publication of an Antidumping Proceeding Notice.
32. Proposed Reg. §153.27(a)(4), 40 Fed. Reg. 30825 (July 23, 1975).
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201(c)(2) has been returned at some point for inadequacy of injury information.
Thirty days after the receipt of a properly filed petition, Treasury, based
on decisions in the Office of Tariff Affairs, must determine whether to
initiate an investigation and thus publish in the FederalRegister an Antidumping Proceeding Notice. 33 During this 30-day period, a preliminary
investigation is conducted by the Customs Service to determine the validity of the information furnished by the petitioner. The resources drawn
upon for information during the preliminary investigation are almost entirely intra-governmental. Thus, for example, the U.S. International Trade
Commission may be requested to furnish a produce description, and the
Customs Service headquarters in Washington may contact the U.S. ports
of entry to determine from import specialists whether invoice prices for the
articles being investigated correspond to those prices found in the petition.
If an antidumping investigation is instituted, practice to date has shown
that at the time of publication of the notice thereof, section 201(c)(2) may
be activated .3 If Treasury at that time concludes that there is substantial
doubt whether an industry in the United States is being, or is likely to be,
injured or is prevented from being established by reason of the importation
of the subject merchandise, it will transmit to the U.S. International Trade
Commission the reasons for such substantial doubt. The Treasury also
must transmit to the Commission a "preliminary indication," based upon
whatever price information is available, concerning sales at less than fair
value. Moreover, the preliminary indication and information must include
possible margins of dumping and the volume of trade.
During the pendency of any U.S. International Trade Commission inquiry pursuant to section 201(c)(2), the Treasury continues with its investigation. Shortly after the publication of the notice of institution of the
investigation, the Customs representatives in the home market where the
subject merchandise is being manufactured are contacted. Before the U.S.
International Trade Commission completes its 30-day inquiry, the foreign
manufacturers receive a Treasury questionnaire. There is no contact with
domestic parties unless they are importers related to the foreign manufacturer, in which case a questionnaire is sent to them.
In deciding whether substantial doubt exists within the meaning of section 201(c)(2) so as to warrant referral of the matter to the U.S. Interna33. The determination to initiate an antidumping investigation must now be made within
30 days of receipt of a properly filed petition as a result of an amendment made by the Trade
Act. Section 321(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2043, adding §201(c)(1) to the Antidumping Act. Prior to this amendment, Treasury had no time limit applicable to such
determination except by way of regulation which imposed a discretionary 30-day period.
34. In all the investigations in which Treasury has used the provisions of section 201(c)(2),
the practice noted in the text has been followed. Under section 201(c)(2), however, its provisions could be invoked at any time during Treasury's 30-day summary investigation.
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tional Trade Commission, Treasury apparently examines and places special emphasis on the capacity utilization of the domestic industry, as well
as on the increasing or decreasing volume of imports.5 Even if the margins
of dumping:" are alleged to be significant, if import penetration is low, 31 or
if no causal connection is apparent between the alleged high margins and
the alleged injury, as required by the Antidumping Act, 3 the case probably
will be sent to the U.S. International Trade Commission on the basis of
substantial doubt. However, if the alleged margins of dumping are 100%,
information available to us indicates that Treasury probably would continue its investigation without referring the matter to the Commission for
an inquiry.
Since the addition of section 201(c)(2), Treasury has had an occasion to
examine a petition based, not upon injury, but upon the likelihood of
injury to a U.S. industry. Treasury found that substantial doubt that an
industry would be likely to be injured existed, based upon the fact that in
order for injury to possibly occur in the future, the foreign manufacturer's
entire production would have to be exported to the United States. Treasury
determined that the possibility that this would happen was not likely.
It is clear from an examination of the petitions filed with Treasury so
far, that it intends to actively apply section 201(c)(2). From January 3,
1975, to December 31, 1975, Treasury received and initiated 23 investigations under the Antidumping Act. In ten of these investigations (43.5% of
the total number of investigations), Treasury found substantial doubt of
the requisite injury and referred the matter to the Commission for a determination under section 201(c)(2).11 This activity by the Treasury under
section 201(c)(2) is surprising, since most knowledgeable trade officials
35. For example, the letter from Treasury of March 24, 1975, pertaining to the alleged
dumping of butadiene acrylonitrile rubber from Japan and notifying the Commission of
Treasury's substantial doubt regarding the requisite injury determination, noted that
"domestic production capacity has been at 95 percent utilization with imports from Japan
during 1974 amounting to less than 1% of domestic consumption." The letter is contained in
the public docket file of the Commission for Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber From Japan,
Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-1.
36. A margin of dumping, as calculated by Treasury, is generally equal to the ratio,
expressed as a percentage, of the difference between the price for which the article in question
is sold in the United States and the home market value, and the price in the United States.
37. See the letter from Treasury of November 18, 1975, pertaining to the alleged dumping
of Portland Hydraulic Cement, Other Than White Nonstaining Cement, From Mexico. The
letter is contained in the public docket file of the Commission for Portland Hydraulic Cement,
Other Than White Nonstaining Cement, From Mexico, Inquiry No. AA1,921-Inq.-2.
38. See, e.g., the letter from Treasury cited supra at note 37, in which the petitioner is
quoted as stating, "the entire cement industry in the United States is in a period of oversupply due to great decline of domestic demand due to the current economic conditions in the
United States."
39. The investigations in which referral to the Commission occurred included one concerning butadine acrylonitrile rubber, eight concerning passenger automobiles, and one concerning portland cement.
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familiar with the inclusion of the section in the Trade Act, including those
from the Treasury, did not anticipate the use of section 201(c)(2) except
on very infrequent occasions. Indeed, it reportedly was suggested that the
frequency would be no more often than once in 15 or 20 investigations. In
any event, the frequent resort to section 201(c)(2) by the Treasury is of
some interest and of considerable significance to petitioners and importers
alike.
B.

Administration By The U.S. InternationalTrade Commission

After Treasury has acted by forwarding to the Commission the reasons
for its substantial doubt and the information available on possible LTFV
sales, the Commission begins its activities under section 201(c)(2). Prior
to receipt of such reasons and information, the Commission generally will
not have been even aware of the petition before Treasury, and even if
aware, most probably will not have taken any steps on the basis thereof.
Section 201(c)(2) provides, with respect to the Commission, as follows:
If within thirty days after receipt of such information from the Secretary,
the Commission, after conducting such inquiry as it deems appropriate,
determines there is no reasonable indication that an industry in the
United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being
established, by reason of the importation of such merchandise into the
United States, it shall advise the Secretary of its determination and any
investigation under subsection (b) then in progress shall be terminated.'"
In administering this language since its effective date over one year ago,
the Commission has developed procedures for the conduct of its function,
and interpretations of key elements of the language.
Developing Commission Procedures
The Commission has not published rules to govern section 201(c)(2)
proceedings, and it is unknown at present when, or if, such rules will be
forthcoming. However, the Commission to date has conducted three inquiries under the provisions of section 201(c)(2), and during that period
there has developed a procedural framework by which the Commission has
carried out its functions under the section. The procedures described may
well not be immutable, especially in light on the wide discretion given to
the Commission by the language of the section and in view of the short
period in which the Commission has to make its determination.
The nature of the proceedings of the Commission under section 201(c)(2)
are governed to a great extent by two basic factors. First, the information
submitted to the Commission from Treasury will be very limited in the
40.

19 U.S.C.A. §160(c)(2) (Supp. 1976).
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vast majority of cases; the statuory 30-day time limit, measured from the
date of receipt of a petition by Treasury, within which Treasury must
determine whether to refer a matter to the Commission under section
201(c)(2), will permit only a cursory review of the petitioner's information
and little if any chance for the development of new data. Second, the
Commission itself has only 30 days after receipt of the information from
the Treasury in which to arrive at its determination regarding "no reasonable indication."" Thus, there is a need to collect as much information of a
usable type as possible in a very short period, and this is reflected in the
procedures developed by the Commission over the past year.
Generally, within 48 hours of receipt of Treasury's letter noting substantial doubt, the Commission will act to formally institute an inquiry into
the matter. The act of instituting such an investigation is done at a formal
Commission meeting, and a notice of such action is published in the
Federal Register, stating the product involved, the nature of Treasury's
advice, and the nature of the Commission's inquiry in the terms of section
201(c)(2). Such notices also have solicited written views of any interested
person, and any known parties are contacted personally by the Commission's staff, initially by phone and most often with a follow-up letter enclosing a copy of the Commission's notice.
While not required by statute,42 the Commission in each of its three
inquiries has held a public hearing. The basis for providing such hearing
is apparently the desire to permit interested parties a chance to confront
each other and to have as much opportunity to present their data and
arguments as possible, as well as a belief that a hearing is a useful
information-gathering device. The Commission's notice of inquiry contains
a notification of the date of the public hearing, which generally is set for
about two weeks from the date of the institution of the inquiry and which
usually is held in Washington.' :
41. The practice of the Commission in the three inquiries it has conducted under section
201(c)(2) has been to take the full 30 days provided for its determination and, in light of the
Commission's need for as much information as possible'in order to make its determination
under section 201(c)(2), it is unlikely to change this practice.
42. Section 201(c)(2) provides only that the Commission shall conduct "such inquiry as
it deems appropriate." Further, the amendments made to the Antidumping Act by section
321(a) of the Trade Act, include the addition of section 201(d)(1), 19 U.S.C.A. §160(d)(1)
(Supp. 1976), which requires the Commission in specified instances to hold a hearing during
the course of its proceedings with respect to the basic injury determination under section
201(a), but significantly makes no reference to any hearings during the course of a section
201(c)(2) inquiry by the Commission.
43. Recent practice of the Commission under several of its statutory authorities has been
to conduct hearings outside of Washington. This practice already has appeared under section
201(c)(2). The public hearing in the inquiry concerning Portland Hydraulic Cement Other
Than White Nonstaining Cement, From Mexico, Docket Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-3, was held
in El Paso, Texas.
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The purpose of the inquiry conducted by the Commission is to gather
data useful to making its determination. The Commission has not been
content to merely examine the accuracy of the data supplied by the petitioner before Treasury." Pursuant to its wide discretionary authority to
conduct such inquiry as it deems appropriate, the Commission has sought
a variety of information in addition to petitioner's information, including:
(1) the total quantities and value of U.S. imports of the subject articles,
as well as only the quantities of imports of those importers possibly selling
at LTFV; (2) the number, size and location of U.S. producers of articles
similar to the imported articles; (3) the quantity and value of U.S.
producers' shipments of articles similar to the imported articles; and (4)
pricing information, including prices of the possible LTFV imports and of
the similar domestic articles. When available, the Commission also has
looked at and sought information on lost sales and unemployment in the
domestic industry. Profit and loss information has not yet been available.
Because of the pressure of time, the Commission has sought data for the
period of possible LTFV sales, for as much of the current year as possible,
and usually for the preceding two or three years; of course, if data is
available for prior years, that data also is considered. The technique used
in each inquiry to date to gather the data has been the sending of questionnaires, which the Commission has authority to require be filled out and
returned.4 5 These are mailed generally within seven days of the date of
institution of the inquiry to domestic producers and importers and are
relatively simple, compared with questionnaires sent out in other Commission investigations; they are generally returnable within 10 days from date
of mailing. Field trips by Commission staff generally have not been conducted, although where a hearing is held outside of Washington, D.C., the
staff may do field work at the site of the hearing, which is selected because
of its convenience to several parties. The Commission also acquires much
information by way of telephone contacts and from its permanent files and
data bank.
Upon the completion of the hearing and the data collection, which
usually occurs within 25 days of the date of receipt of Treasury's advice of
substantial doubt, a staff report to the Commission is prepared. This staff
report is not available to the parties. It collects and analyzes the information gathered by the Commission but has not to date included a recommendation as to how the Commission should decide the case.
The Commission has adopted the practice of publishing its determination in each inquiry conducted under section 201(c)(2), and most of the
Commissioners have presented a statement of reasons for their determina44. Indeed, as indicated in the text supra at note 33, Treasury performs such an examination during its summary investigation following receipt of a properly filed petition.
45. 19 U.S.C.A. §1333 (1965).
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tion. Publication occurs in the Federal Register, and the Commission prepares separate copies for distribution. This practice parallels that followed
by the Commission under the basic injury provision of the Antidumping
Act.
The publication of the decision and the presentation of reasons have
developed even though under the statute they are not required. Read
literally, section 201(c)(2) requires notification of the Treasury only when
the Commission finds no reasonable indication of the requisite injury.
Further, the Antidumping Act does require publication of the Commission's injury determination under section 201(a), but publication is not
statutorily provided for with respect to its section 201(c)(2) determination." Also, while the legislative history does not say anything about publication of a Commission determination and the reasons therefor under section 201(c)(2), legislative history does suggest with respect to the Treasury's analogous ability to terminate work on a petition during the first 30
days after receipt of a complaint under section 201(c)(1) that a public
announcement of such termination is not needed.47
Criteria
As indicated above, section 201(c)(2) requires that the Commission determine if
there is no reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is

being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by
reason of the importation of such merchandise into the United
States. . . . (Emphasis added.)
If the Commission so determines and reports this to Treasury, any Treasury proceedings with respect to the merchandise in question are terminated. Crucial to any determination under the statute is the Commission's
interpretation of the italicized statutory words." As of March 1, 1976, the
Commission has not published interpretative rules regarding such section
or otherwise considered the meaning of the words except in the three opinions issued by the Commission since the effective date of section 201(c)(2).
46. Section 201(d)(2) of the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §160(d)(2) (Supp. 1976), as
added by §321(a) of the Trade Act, 88 Stat. 2045 (1974), requires publication of the Commission determination and reasons therefor only with respect to the determination made under
section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act.
47. See FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11 at 170, wherein it is flatly stated:
Although such negative determinations [to institute an investigation] shall not be
published, it is the assumption of the committee that the party presenting the
information ...
shall be informed of the discontinuance of the inquiry.
48. This is especially so in this instance because of the wide discretion which the Commission has in interpreting such terms with virtually no possibility of judicial review, as discussed
in the text accompanying notes 87-90, infra.
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No reasonable indication
The phrase, "no reasonable indication," is new to the Antidumping Act
and sets the standard by which causation and injury are measured under
section 201(c)(2).
The parties to the three inquiries conducted by the Commission under
section 201(c)(2 have offered various interpretations of this language. One
party has suggested that no reasonable indication of injury should be found
only when the Commission's inquiry fails to produce any information
which sustains an indication of injury. 9 Another party has asserted that
the Commission should find no reasonable indication of injury where the
indications of injury are mere assertions lacking adequate factual support
or are clearly rebutted by other information before the Commission. 0 The
party further asserts that the Commission should not engage in speculation, but should determine whether the"available information reasonably
indicates that the statutory test of injury would be met in a full threemonth investigation under section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act. In contrast to the first suggested interpretation is the suggestion by one party
that no reasonable indication should be found only when there is no objective evidence of a fair, credible, and persuasive kind that demonstrates
with a fair degree of certainty that the imported articles in question have
been a significant or appreciable cause of injury."
Individual Commissioners have considered the meaning of the phrase
"no reasonable indication" in each of the three inquiries conducted under
section 201 (c)(2). The first inquiry involved butadiene acrylonitrile rubber
from Japan. 2 The Commission, after referral of the matter from Treasury
in late March, 1975 and after conducting a 30-day inquiry, did not determine that no reasonable indication of injury existed. 53 Noting that this was
49. See Brief on Behalf of the International Union, United Automobile Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, pp. 13-14, filed in New, On-the-Highway FourWheeled, Passenger Automobiles from Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and West Germany, Docket Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-2 [hereinafter
Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-2].
50. See Brief on Behalf of Japan Automobile Manuafacturers Association, p. 7, filed in
Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-2, supra note 49.
51. See Memorandum of the Counsel for the Automobile Importers of America, Inc., of
August 25, 1975, p. 8, filed in Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-2, supra note 49.
52. U.S. International Trade Commission, Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber From Japan,
Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-1, ITC Pub. 727, April, 1975.
53. The Commission majority consisted of then Chairman Bedell (now Commissioner),
then Vice Chairman Parker (now Commissioner), and Commissioners Leonard (now
Chairman) and Moore. Commissioners Ablondi and Minchew, (now Vice Chairman) dissented, determining that there was no reasonable indication of the requisite injury to an
industry. The negative phrasing of the statute causes the use of the double negative when
the statutory standard is not met.
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the first Commission determination under section 201(c)(2), three of the
commissioners forming the majority undertook to explain their determination.' These three Commissioners found that the phrase "no reasonable
indication" should be interpreted to require the termination of an ongoing
Treasury investigation only when there is
a clear and convincing showing that there is "no reasonable indication"
that a full investigation might develop facts which could afford a basis for
an affirmative injury determination under the act.55
These Commissioners then found that the 30-day inquiry had disclosed
the existence of evidence which indicates a possibility of injury or
possibility of likelihood of injury. The evidence, in our judgment, is certainly sufficient to negate a determination at this time that there is no
reasonable indication of injury or likelihood of injury from possible lessthan-fair-value imports."
The evidence referred to consisted of "some evidence . . . which tends to
show" under-selling of the domestic article by the Japanese article and of
"some evidence to indicate" that there were below-cost sales of the Japanese article and that sales of the domestic article have been lost to Japanese imports. 57 A strict reading of this statement leads to the conclusion
that these Commissioners did not determine that, absent a possibility of
injury or possibility of likelihood of injury, they must find "no reasonable
indication" of the requisite injury, thus resulting in the termination of the
investigation. They found only that a possibility of injury or possibility of
likelihood of injury is certainly sufficient to negate a finding of "no reasonable indication."
To arrive at their interpretation, the three Commissioners referred to the
language in the Senate Finance Committee Report concerning the intent
"to eliminate unnecessary and costly investigations which are an administrative burden and an impediment to trade." ' They indicated that they
did not believe it was the intent that section 201(c)(2) be used to
weaken-or to deny U.S. industry-the protection of the Antidumping
59
Act.
In their dissenting statements, Commissioners Ablondi and Minchew
found that the evidence developed in the inquiry was insufficient to indi54. Commissioner Moore did not issue a statement of the reasons for his decision in this
inquiry, nor has he done so in subsequent inquiries. Whether such a statement is required is
discussed in the text accompanying note 47, supra.
55. Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber, supra note 52 at 5.
56. Id. [emphasis added].
57. Id.at 6.
58. FINANCE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 11 at 171.
59. Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber, supra note 52 at 5.
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cate injury or the likelihood thereof at the time. They therefore determined
that no reasonable indication of injury existed. Both Commissioners used
phrases such as the "evidence of underselling. . . does not appear to have
had sufficient impact to cause an injury or the likelihood thereof' and "the
market penetration of LTFV sales is not significant. . . ."10 The minority
Commissioners stated that their interpretation gave meaningful effect to
the language of the Finance Committee Report cited by the majority.
The second inquiry conducted by the Commission involved imports of
certain new, on-the-highway, four-wheeled, passenger automobiles from
Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany (hereinafter Passenger Automobiles).' This matter,
which involved $7.5 billion in trade, was referred to the Commission by the
Treasury in August, 1975. Upon conclusion of the 30-day inquiry, once
again the Commission did not determine that no reasonable indication of
injury existed."2
In this second inquiry, some refinement was made in their statements
of reasons by various members of the Commission regarding the interpretations given to the phrase "no reasonable indication." Chairman Leonard
in a separate statement found, in effect, that "no reasonable indication"
means
that the allegations made by the complainant before the Treasury and the
information available as a result of the Commission's inquiry reveal issues
of injury and causation to be so clearly lacking in substance that the
resources of the government should not be used to any further extent in
and that trade should not be disrupted further by
considering the matter,
6 3
such consideration.
The Chairman examined the congressional purpose in enacting the statute and also the circumstances (of which he considered Congress to be
aware) in which the Commission performs its functions under section
201(c)(2). Because of the language of section 201(c)(2) and the shortness
of the time allowed Treasury to consider a petition prior to deciding
whether to institute an investigation, and after noting the oft-quoted congressional purpose of section 201(c)(2), he asserted that Congress would be
60.

Id. at 9.

61. U.S. International Trade Commission, New On-the-Highway, Four-Wheeled, Passenger Automobiles from Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany, Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-2, ITC Pub. 739, September, 1975.
62. The Commission majority consisted of Chairman Leonard and Commissioners Moore,
Bedell, and Parker, with Commissioner Ablondi joining them with respect to imports of
automobiles from Japan, West Germany, and Italy. Vice Chairman Minchew dissented and
determined that there was "no reasonable indication" of the requisite injury and was joined
by Commissioner Ablondi with respect to automobiles from Belgium, Canada, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
63. Passenger Automobiles, supra note 61 at 8-9.
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aware that the Commission would be receiving from Treasury very limited
information, not concrete or likely to aid the Commission in carrying out
its functions. 4 He considered Congress also to be aware that the 30-day
period provided for the Commission's inquiry would severely limit datagathering, the testing of the reliability of such data, and the Commission's
consideration of whatever information was gathered. 5
Chairman Leonard then noted that Treasury, during its 30-day period
under section 201(c)(1), was not expected to do more than have information of possible LTFV sales and indicated, in effect, that one could expect
no more than an analogous requirement of the Commission." Further, he
said the Commission was not required under section 201(c)(2) to find the
requisite injury to a domestic industry as a result of the requisite cause,
as it is required to do under section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act,6 7 and
was not required to make a "reason to believe" determination or a determination that sufficient allegations concerning injury and causation have
been made on the face of the complaint filed with Treasury to state a cause
of action. Presumably, if Congress had intended the Commission to perform those functions, the statute would have said so.6 8 Finally, Chairman
Leonard noted that the statutory phrase was "no reasonable indication,"
and he considered this an indication that the statute thus placed the
emphasis not on a positive justification for the continuance of antidumping
6
investigation but in effect on a justification for its termination. 1
Commissioners Bedell and Parker, who along with Chairman Leonard
and Commissioner Moore formed the majority in the Commission's first
inquiry under section 201(c)(2), used language in their separate statement
in this second inquiry similar to the language they used in the first inquiry.
They indicated that a full investigation should not be aborted in the
absence of a clear and convincing showing that there is no reasonable
indication that an industry in the United States has been or is likely to
be injured by the reason of importation of merchandise possibly sold at
less-than-fair value. 6
Commissioners Parker and Bedell did not consider whether the evidence
developed in this inquiry showed a possibility of injury or possibility of
likelihood of injury. Their discussion of the evidence was in terms only of
the lack of clear and convincing evidence of "no reasonable indication."
Thus, nothing specifically is found in this statement which aids in under64. Id. at 6.
65. Id.

66. Id. at 7.
67.
68.

19 U.S.C.A. §160(a) (Supp. 1976).
Passenger Automobiles, supra note 61 at 7.

69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 16-17.
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standing how they interprete the phrase "no reasonable indication."
Commissioner Ablondi, in his separate statement of reasons for finding
in part that there was no reasonable indication of injury to an industry,
indicated that the Commission standard should be to "eliminate investigations under section 201 when such investigations clearly are unnecessary
because there is no reasonable indication that a domestic industry is being
or is likely to be injured."" Commissioner Ablondi further indicated in
making his statement with respect to imports of automobiles from Belgium, the United Kingdom, Sweden, andFrance, that import penetration
by any one country of less than one percent of United States consumption
on a national basis is insignificant and could not warrant an injury determination .
In a separate statement, Vice Chairman Minchew indicated that
a working definition of the term "no reasonable indication" still is being
developed. The standard of evidence clearly is different from that required
for a full investigation. However, a very low standard for what constitutes
"no reasonable indication" could lead to a negative finding in virtually
every 30-day investigation. Consequently, the standard must be considerably higher than a finding that new evidence added to present evidence
possibly would show injury caused by LTFV imports.73
Vice Chairman Minchew went on to say:
Congress apparently felt that complainants must present sufficient evidence to support sustaining an investigation, not that respondents must
establish reasons why the investigation should not go forward. Raising the
standard of evidence to support the complainants' case accomplishes the
Congressional purpose."
The third inquiry decided by the Commission under section 201(c)(2)
involved imports of portland hydraulic cement, other than white nonstaining cement, from Mexico."5 After being advised by Treasury on November
18, 1975, of the existence of substantial doubt, the Commission conducted
this inquiry and again did not find that no reasonable indication of injury
existed."6 Commissioner Leonard in his statement in this inquiry referred
to his statement in the second inquiry that "so clearly lacking in sub71. Id. at 23.
72. Id. at 29.
73. Id. at 32-33 [emphasis in original].

74.

Id. at 33.

75. U.S. International Trade Commission, Portland Hydraulic Cement, Other Than
White Nonstaining Cement, From Mexico, Inquiry No. AA1921-Inq.-3, ITC Pub. 751, December, 1975 [hereinafter Portland Cement].
76. The Commission majority consisted of Chairman Leonard and Commissioners Bedell,
Parker, Ablondi and Moore. Vice Chairman Minchew dissented, finding no reasonable indication of injury.
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stance" is the standard for finding no reasonable indication. 77 Commissioners Parker and Bedell did not expand upon the explanation regarding "no
reasonable indication" given in their statement in the second inquiry.
Commissioner Ablondi indicated that he found a U.S. industry may be
threatened with injury if theMexican cement producer, accounting for the
bulk of the imports being considered, gained entry into the market for bulk
7
cement by means of LTFV sales. 1
Vice Chairman Minchew once again found no reasonable indication of
injury. He commented that it is necessary in order to find no reasonable
indication to determine that none of the usual indices of injury are present.79 He added:
[V]ery little guidance is obtained from the statute as to how high or how
low the threshold of reasonable indication should be. For me the threshold
will have to be higher than one so low that even the weakest cases are
returned to Treasury.a
Vice Chairman Minchew indicated that before Treasury the petitioner has
produced some evidence that the Mexican producer involved had attempted to penetrate the cement bulk sales market. He stated however,
that
thus far, we have evidence only of attempts which failed. Without establishing a reasonable indication that CDC can succeed in penetrating the
domestic market, I do not feel that we should continue to investigate. 1
From an examination of the statements of reasons in the three inquiries,
certain conclusions may be drawn. First, it would appear that a majority
of the present Commission considers that the wording of section 201(c)(2)
should be read literally and that what must be demonstrated to terminate
a pending investigation in Treasury is that there is no-reasonable indication of injury. Thus, assuming sufficient allegations of injury to satisfy
Treasury's petitioning requirements, it would appear that absent an affirmative showing of no reasonable indication, the Commission will not so
find. In other words, if the allegations cannot be rebutted or overwhelmed
by positive indications of no injury to an industry, whether developed by
the Commission or by those in opposition to the petition in Treasury, the
Commission will not determine that there is "no reasonable indication."
The burden is clearly upon the opponents to the investigation. Only Vice
Chairman Minchew has definitely rejected this formulation; he would require the demonstration of a reasonable indication of injury.
77.
78.

Portland Cement, supra note 75 at 3.
Id. at 5.

79.

Id. at 7.

80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 9.
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Further, it would appear that a present majority of the Commission
requires that "no reasonable indication" of injury be shown by "clear and
convincing evidence" or by evidence "clearly" showing this. The standard
is higher than that required in a full investigation under section 201(a) and
clearly shows the slant of the Commission toward not terminating
Treasury investigations under section 201(c)(2). The Commission appears
unanimous in considering that the decision must be based on evidence
discovered at the time of the decision, and not upon speculation as to what
evidence may be uncovered in the future.
Finally, a majority of the Commission has not really expressed in clear
terms an interpretation of "no reasonable indication." Commissioner
Moore has made no statements about his interpretation of the phrase. Two
Commissioners have indicated that a finding that there exists the
possibility of injury or the possibility of the likelihood of injury is enough
to negate "no reasonable indication," but have not indicated that this is
the basic standard to be applied-only that it is certainly sufficient to lead
to a negative finding. Chairman Leonard has indicated positively that the
standard is that the information available with respect to the issues of
injury and causation must be
so clearly lacking in substance that the resources of the government should
not be used to any further extent in considering the matter and that trade
should not be disrupted further by such consideration."8
Commissioners Ablondi and Minchew have used terms such as "not . . .
sufficient impact," "not significant," and "insignificant" when referring to
indicators of injury and arriving at a finding of no reasonable indication.
Vice Chairman Minchew has indicated that "the standard must be considerably higher than a finding that new evidence added to present evidence
possibly would show injury caused by LTFV imports."s' 3
In any event, it appears that a majority of the Commission has adopted
a rather high standard of what must be shown to demonstrate "no reasonable indication." In at least two of three inquiries there was very little
evidence of market penetration or of other traditional indicators of injury.
It seems that the majority of the Commission believes that there actually
must be no single indication of injury, unless completely rebutted or overcome by other indicators, before a finding of "no reasonable indication"
will be made.
Industry in the United States is being or likely to be injured, or is
prevented from being established by reason of
Section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act, which establishes the criteria for
82.
83.

Passenger Automobiles, supra note 61 at 8-9.
Id. at 32-33.

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

the Commission's basic determination of injury under the act, provides
that "the Commission shall determine . . . whether an industry in the
United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being
established, by reason of the importation" of the articles concerned. Since
there is no indication in any legislative history that the meaning of the
terms used in both sections 201(a) and 201(c)(2) should be interpreted
differently, it appears that the terms should be interpreted in the same
way. While only Chairman Leonard has stated this conclusion," no other
Commissioner has stated a different conclusion and there are no indications that they would do so.
While the terms may have the same meaning under both sections, this
does not mean that the determination under each section is the same.
Under section 201(c)(2), the determination is one of no reasonable
indication of injury, not one of the injury itself, as under section 201(a).
Further, with respect to the phrase "by reason of," Chairman Leonard
noted in the PassengerAutomobiles inquiry:
Turning to the phrase "by reason of" in section 210(c)(2), again there
is no basis to conclude that Congress intended this phrase to have any
meaning different from the one given to the same phrase employed in
section 201(a) of the Act; that is, the same degree of causality is expressed
by the use of the indentical phrase in both sections. Since the Commission, however, under section 201(c)(2) is dealing with only the merchandise the subject of Treasury's investigation, and is determining if there is
"no reasonable indication" of the requisite causal relationship, as opposed
to dealing under section 201(a) with merchandise actually found by Treasury to be, or likely to be, sold at less than fair value and determining if
the requisite causal relationship actually exists, the distinct determinations under these section are totally different. 5
Thus, the determination under section 201(c)(2) does not predetermine
the outcome under section 201(a). The development of information during
the three-month investigation under section 201(a) may well call for a
determination that the criteria of the Antidumping Act with respect to
injury are not satisfied, even though the Commission did not find "no
reasonable indication" of injury under section 201(c)(2).
C. Judicial Review
Under section 201(c)(2), if the Commission determines that there is "no
reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is being injured," it shall advise the Secretary of the Treasury of its determination
and any Treasury investigation then in progress shall be terminated. If the
84.
85.

Id. at 9-13.
Id. at 12-13.
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Commission does not make such a determination, any Treasury investigation then in progress may continue. The question arises as to whether
judicial review is available with respect to any such determination of the
Commission.
It is clear that section 201(d)(2) of the Antidumping Act was added by
the Trade Act so that parties would have sufficient information for the
purpose of appeal of a determination under section 201(a) of the act. In
reference to the requirement that the Commission must publish a "complete statement" of reasons for a section 201(a) determination, the Finance
Committee Report states:
The Committee is making clear its intent that sufficient information be
provided in the case of each determination, to enable all interested parties
to be aware of the reasons for, and details of, such determinations and to
effectively protect their rights . . . in the courts."
Unlike the requirement of section 201(d)(2) of the Antidumping Act,
with respect to section 201(a) the Commission does not have to issue a
statement of findings and conclusions under section 201(c)(2).17 Indeed, if
the Commission does not determine that there is no reasonable indication
of injury to an industry, it does not have to transmit anything in writing
to the Treasury. However, as has been seen in the discussions of the three
inquiries decided so far, the Commission has adopted the procedure of
issuing an opinion to the Treasury.
It appears that the requirements for issuing statements of findings and
reasons affect the ability of parties to appeal a section 201(c)(2) determination. The absence of a requirement in the act to issue section 201(c)(2)
statements by the Commission, while statements are required under section 201(a), is persuasive that judicial review of section 201(c)(2) findings
is not available.
Furthermore, a determination under section 201(a) is treated as a final
determination and, therefore, mandatory. The nature of the Treasury's
action in issuing a dumping finding is purely ministerial, since the Commission finding under section 201(a) is final. However, the Commission's
determination under section 201(c)(2) is not a final act in the administrative process in antidumping proceedings unless there is a determination of
no reasonable indication. Thus, in cases where there is not a finding of no
reasonable indication, the Treasury, upon further investigation of whether
there are LTFV sales, could terminate the proceedings. This leads us to
conclude that such determinations are not final and hence are not ready
for review.
Even if judicial review under section 201(c)(2) is available, it is ex86.
87.

FINANCE COMMI'rEE REPORT, supra note 11 at 171 [emphasis supplied].

See text accompanying notes 46 and 47, supra.
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tremely unlikely that a court would overrule the Commission's determination. On several occasions, the courts have reviewed antidumping determinations. 8 In each judicial examination, the courts have limited their review to the question of whether the Commission has exceeded its delegated
statutory authority.89 Unless the Commission misconstrues the law, clearly
abuses its discretion, or makes a determination without support of substantial evidence, it will not be overturned.5 ° To date, no injury determination has been overruled or modified by the reviewing courts. Moreover, this
article has described the limited legislative assistance which has been
provided the Commission in its task of interpreting the language contained
in section 201(c)(2); the absence of any clear interpretative remarks provides the Commission great discretion in determining the meaning of the
language.
Although it appears, then, that there is no judicial review available to
parties adversely affected by a Commission determination under section
201(c)(2), even if such review were made, there is no reason to conclude
that the great flexibility permitted the Commission by the courts under
section 201(a) would not also be given the Commission in its interpretation
of the language contained in section 201(c)(2).
III.

CONCLUSION

The addition of section 201(c)(2) to the Antidumping Act presented the
possibility of significant changes in the administration of that Act by the
Treasury and the U.S. International Trade Commission. The Treasury has
had to resort to this section rather frequently. However, the interpretation
given to the language of section 201(c)(2) by a present majority of the
Commission indicates that in fact it will be relatively rare that a pending
Treasury antidumping investigation will be terminated under this section.
The Commission interpretation seems well founded, although the wide
discretion available to the Commission in the interpretation of the language leaves open the possibility of a change in interpretation as membership in the Commission changes.
88. See, e.g., Kleberg & Co. v. United States, 71 F. 2d 332 (C.C.P.A. 1933); City Lumber
Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 385 (Cust. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 311 F. Supp. 340 (Cust. Ct.
1970).
89. See Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961), which
was affirmed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 50 C.C.P.A. 36 (Customs 1963).
90. See City Lumber Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 385 (Cust. Ct. 1968). However,
the "substantial evidence" rule is an Administrative Procedure Act requirement and may not
be applicable to Commission proceedings under section 201(a) or section 201(c)(2). See Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1189 at 1192 (C.C.P.A. 1973).

